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1. From the mid-1970s to the end of the 1990s, Argentina showed a strong dependence on 
foreign savings. As a result, frequent shifts in financial capital flows have had a huge impact 
in terms of macroeconomic volatility, characterised by stop-and-go processes. This situation 
has worsened over the last 20 years due to different changes both in the size and direction of 
financial capital flows which, in turn, caused huge changes in the levels of activity, output and 
employment, and the financial sector as well. During this period, capital flows in international 
financial markets recorded procyclical fluctuations with large inflows at peak periods and 
abrupt outflows in the phase of recession.  
The last recession in Argentina, which started in the second half of 1998 and lasted until the 
second half of 2002, and the abandonment of the convertibility system in early 2002 were the 
most recent episodes in which capital flow fluctuations had a particularly severe impact on 
economic performance. For this reason and as one of its economic pillars, from 2002 
onwards economic policy has focused on stabilising the foreign exchange market and 
addressing the problems related to the volatility of short-term financial capital flows. The 
crisis showed once again that, given the size of international financial capital flows and the 
low degree of domestic capital and financial deepening, in a highly indebted economy, it was 
particularly important to implement policies to regulate and manage such flows, as other 
emerging countries have already been doing. 
The impact of capital flows on the Argentine economy from 2001 to 2007 may be 
summarised as follows: (i) in a context of open capital account movements, there was a 
strong capital flight in the period prior to the abandonment of the convertibility regime; (ii) at 
the end of 2001, before the convertibility collapse, regulations on foreign exchange 
transactions were introduced and then, in early 2002, the peso was devalued, regulatory 
scheme on the capital account were enlarged and a floating exchange rate regime was 
introduced. All these factors caused short-term financial capital outflows to begin to decline 
rapidly during the first months of 2002; (iii) from 2003 to mid-2005, in the wave of larger 
capital inflows with the economic recovery under way, economic policy, on the one hand, 
continued to relax strict general regulations on capital outflows introduced during the crisis 
and, on the other hand, began to strengthen capital account regulations on short-term 
financial inflows; and (iv) in an international financial framework characterised by high levels 
of liquidity and low interest rates (that lasted until mid-2007), the economy continued to grow 
rapidly, as did short-term financial capital inflows. 
2. Table 1, Balance of payments, shows the high volatility of capital flows that Argentina 
faced. It further shows that during 1992–2000 an annual average current account deficit of 
US$ 9.3 billion was financed by inflows in the capital and financial accounts. That situation 
changed in 2001, when the US$ 4.5 billion current account deficit could no longer be 
financed because of a massive reversal in capital inflows and, as a result, international 
reserves were significantly reduced by US$ 12 billion. During that year, net inflows came only 
from multilateral organisations (US$ 11.14 billion), particularly the IMF, and were comparable 
to the reduction of international reserves. This high volatility of capital flows affected the 
evolution of the real economy: GDP grew by 8.1% in 1997, declined by 4.4% and 10.9% in 
2001 and 2002, respectively, and then rebounded to grow by 8.9% and 9.02% in 2003 and 




Balance of payments 
In millions of US dollars
1 
  Average 
1992–
2000 







I. Current account  –9,382  –4,483  8,767 8,140 3,217 5,691 8,092 5,454  4,177
Goods –804  7,451  17,178 16,805 13,265 13,087 13,872 10,171  8,730
Exports fob  21,053  26,610  25,651 29,939 34,576 40,387 46,456 33,937  39,304
Imports fob  21,857  19,159  8,473 13,134 21,311 27,300 32,585 23,766  30,574
Services –3,754  –3,912  –1,460 –1,193 –1,330 –1,187 –837  –851  –959
Exports 4,007  4,366  3,495 4,500 5,289 6,453 7,666 5,377  6,737
Imports 7,762  8,278  4,956 5,693 6,618 7,640 8,503 6,228  7,696
Income –5,303  –8,243  –7,491 –7,975 –9,282 –6,737 –5,440 –4,229  –3,902
Investment income  –5,309  –8,244  –7,466 –7,950 –9,243 –6,686 –5,381 –4,184  –3,845
Interest –3,529  –7,384  –7,696 –7,317 –6,956 –3,358 –1,120 –943  –465
Credit 4,077  4,821  2,653 2,615 2,818 3,239 4,038 2,895  3,791
Debit 7,607  12,205  10,349 9,932 9,774 6,598 5,158 3,838  4,257
Public sector  4,350  7,112  6,344 6,660 6,929 3,919 2,677 1,973  2,402
Private sector  3,257  5,093  4,005 3,272 2,845 2,679 2,481 1,865  1,855
Profits and dividends  –1,780 –861  230 –633 –2,286 –3,327 –4,261  –3,241  –3,380
Credit 630  789  350 451 861 989 1,318  999  886
Debit
2 2,410  1,649  120 1,084 3,148 4,317 5,580 4,240  4,266
Current transfers  480  221  540 504 564 529 497  363  307
II. Capital and 
financial account  12,628 –4,568 –11,404 –3,203 1,470 3,391 –5,562 –5,534  5,811
Capital account  53  101  406 39 41 240 97  96  111
Financial account  12,575  –4,668  –11,810 –3,243 1,274 3,302 –5,659 –5,630  5,700
Banking sector  1,122  11,588  –2,573 –3,001 –3,097 –4,356 –10,521 –9,959  1,121
BCRA –86  10,743  –1,808 –868 –1,990 –2,922 –10,400  –9,961  752
Non-financial public 
sector  7,050 –3,439  3,618 4,641 4,910 3,368 3,132 1,716  1,681
National 
government  6,792 –3,029  3,683 4,739 5,035 3,341 2,956 2,002  1,326
Non-financial 




12,856 –4,882 –539 4,290 1,730 2,612  2,897
III. Net errors and 
omissions  –1,084 –3,032 –1,878 –1,356 630 –226 1,000  –181  169
IV. International 
reserves variation 
(I + II + III)  2,162 
–
12,083 –4,516 3,581 5,319 8,857 3,530  –261  10,157
International 
organisations (net)  1,719  11,144  –2,325 –937 –2,434 –3,223 –10,923 –10,808  –23
1  Provisional data.    
2  Profit and dividends of the financial sector not included for 2002. 
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Since the abandonment of the convertibility regime (a fixed and convertible exchange rate 
one-to-one to the US dollar), and the peso devaluation that changed relative prices in favour 
of the tradable goods sector, economic policy has sought to stabilise the foreign exchange 
market and restore basic macroeconomic equilibria. Thus, in 2002, the drop in international 
reserves, which plunged to US$ 9 billion, was significantly reduced by an improvement in the 
current account emerging due, predominantly, to a trade balance surplus. As a result of the 
economic policy stance, since the third quarter of 2002 onwards the Argentine economy has 
expanded continuously, with surpluses on its current account and higher international 
reserves reaching US$ 46 billion in December 2007. 
Table 1 also shows trends of different items of the balance of payments both in the period 
following the collapse of the convertibility regime and during the recovery. The following major 
changes should be highlighted: (i) unlike the previous decade, from 2002 onwards Argentina 
has made net payments of US$ 19.8 billion to multilateral organisations; (ii) there was a 
continuous reduction in the services account deficit, which has also contributed to the current 
account improvement; (iii) net payments of profits and dividends, which had declined due to the 
1998–2002 recession and the implementation of capital regulations in 2002, recovered and 
reached US$ 4.3 billion in 2006, reflecting the economic recovery and the flexible handling of 
those capital regulations; (iv) during the period 2002–04, before the conclusion of the 
Argentine debt swap process, there were high levels of accrued interest that have been paid 
since 2005; (v)  the non-financial private sector reduced financial capital outflows, which 
amounted to US$ 12 billion during 2001–02, and private capital inflows started to return in 
2005. 
Table 2, Foreign exchange balance, shows the evolution of the main items with a direct 
effect on the single free exchange market (MULC) following the abandonment of the 
convertibility system. Current account surpluses were achieved thanks to a permanent 
surplus on the trade balance, which has been greater than US$ 10 billion since 2003. In 
addition, the services item (including, among others, technical and professional assistance, 
tourism and transport) went from a slightly negative result to a positive one, whereas profits 
and dividends – as shown in Balance of payments – showed a negative result basically due 
to the interest payments accrued after the default on the external debt (the table also shows 
a decrease in interest payments to the IMF after the full repayment in January 2006).  
Profits and dividends showed an increasingly negative result due to continuous economic 
growth. Furthermore, the components of the capital account showed a continuous increase 
in net income from non-residents as a result of foreign direct investments that reached 
US$ 1.6 billion in early 2007, twice as much as the amount recorded in 2003. Until 2005 
portfolio investment explained the strong financial capital inflows that were later interrupted 
by the aforementioned implementation of regulatory measures on inflows, particularly on 
short-term financial inflows. The lines of credit related to international trade have shown a 
continuous increase with a negative net result until 2005 and a positive result since that year. 
The IMF and multilateral organisations item clearly shows that from 2003 to 2007 Argentina 
made net payments of US$ 22 billion.  
During the period 2003–05 the domestic demand for foreign currency from the non-financial 
private sector remained virtually unchanged, reaching US$ 12 billion with a slight upward 
trend in the next two years. Since July 2007 the international financial markets have been 
characterised by higher instability. This situation generated a greater domestic demand for 
foreign assets, which was supplied by the sale of Central Bank foreign reserves in the spot 
market and Central Bank positions in the futures market. These measures were successful 
as they decreased the pressure on the foreign exchange market and proved how suitable a 
policy of precautionary reserve accumulation can be to deal with financial volatility in the 
absence of a lender of last resort. Foreign asset accumulation inflows were close to 




Foreign exchange balance 
In millions of US dollars 
2003 2004 2005  2006  2007 
 
Total Total Total Total  9  months  9  months
Foreign exchange current account  8,731  10,144  9,313  10,834  8,239  10,302 
Goods  trade  balance  12,595 12,778 12,689 13,303 10,435 12,086 
Services  –337  –234 341 776 493 701 
Income  –3,752 –2,756 –4,187 –3,826 –3,110 –3,170 
Interest  –2,883 –1,914 –2,895 –2,686 –1,931 –1,754 
Inflows  247 373 709  1,247 913  1,754 
Outflows  3,130 2,288 3,604 3,933 2,844 3,508 
Interest payments to the 
International Monetary Fund  745  572  525  90  86  15 
Interest payments to other 
international  agencies  820 543 646 712 583 617 
Other interest payments  1,565 1,173 2,433 3,131 2,176 2,876 
Profits and dividends and other income  –869  –842 –1,292 –1,140 –1,179 –1,416 
Inflows  90  89 125 447  61 135 
Outflows  959  931 1,416 1,586 1,240 1,551 
Other  current  transfers  225 356 471 580 421 685 
Inflows  680 1,034 1,320 1,357  970 1,241 
Outflows  455 678 849 777 550 555 
Foreign exchange capital and 
financial  account  –5,149 –4,825  –465 –7,420 –8,617  –182 
Non-resident direct investment  809  976 1,451 1,504 1,031 1,608 
Inflows  902  991 1,548 1,526 1,050 1,660 
Outflows  93 16 97 23 19 53 
Non-resident portfolio investment  509  579  1,125  171  67  58 
Inflows  549 657  1,170 213 101  88 
Outflows  40 78 45 42 33 30 
Financial loans and credit lines  –1,184 –1,279 –1,855  1,310  471  2,146 
Inflows  1,493 2,491 3,411 6,128 3,509 6,691 
Outflows  2,677 3,771 5,266 4,818 3,037 4,545 
International Monetary Fund loans  –19  –2,050  –3,595  –9,530  –9,530  0 
Other international agencies’ loans  –1,354  –468  520  –1,415  –1,233  –7 
Non-financial private sector foreign 
asset accumulation  –3,808  –2,837  1,206 –2,939 –2,026 –6,088 
Inflows  7,735 9,728  12,968  11,427 8,164  10,525 
Outflows 11,543  12,565  11,762 14,366 10,190 16,612 
Financial sector foreign asset 
accumulation  (GEP)  –276 465  –356  51 242  –168 
Financial sector securities transactions  0  0  –95  398  230  227 
Other public sector transactions (net)  –274  –297  640  2,106  1,611  1,469 
Other  net  movements  448  87 493 924 519 574 
Changes in international reserves 
arising from transactions  3,581 5,319 8,847 3,414  –378  10,120 
Note: Temporary data. 
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Finally, in the item “Other public sector transactions”, since the Argentine debt swap finished 
in 2005, financing has been obtained by the Treasury in market operations. As a result, there 
was a continuous increase in international reserves even in 2006, when Argentina made an 
early and full repayment of its debt to the IMF. 
3. Given the high and persistent macroeconomic volatility experienced by the Argentine 
economy, the change in economic policy introduced in 2002 sought to generate conditions 
for achieving sustained economic growth and preventing foreign volatility from passing 
through to the domestic economy. As shown by other successful cases of economic 
development, the avoidance of recurring episodes of real exchange rate appreciation, usually 
followed by sharp nominal devaluations, is considered an essential requirement for the 
economy to follow the path of sustained development. The policies and measures designed 
to regulate short-term financial capital flows (both inflows and outflows) and precautionary 
reserve accumulation should be analysed within this framework. Such regulations are tools 
of countercyclical policy that cushion the effects of shifts in financial flows over the economic 
cycle and help to reduce volatility in domestic financial markets. 
Higher short-term financial capital inflows give rise, via both domestic credit and aggregate 
demand expansion, to a process of real exchange rate appreciation, a phenomenon that 
occurs in emerging economies favoured by a much better export performance and/or terms 
of trade. In fact, the management of short-term financial capital inflows involves a short-term 
macroeconomic threat: (i) if exchange rate flexibility is limited, capital inflows may create a 
sudden rise in domestic credit and in prices of domestic assets, generating demand 
pressures and inflation (where aggregate supply does not react); (ii) alternatively, if the 
domestic currency appreciates, the external sector suffers a loss of competitiveness, 
adversely affecting aggregate demand, the industrial sector and employment.  
Argentina’s precautionary reserve accumulation policy that led to an endogenous expansion 
of monetary aggregates, domestic credit and finally aggregate demand. The policy has been 
accompanied by a series of direct regulations that were implemented following the 
abandonment of the convertibility system. First, the aim of such regulations was to 
discourage short-term speculative financial capital inflows (attracted by appreciation 
expectations combined with positive interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign 
financial assets) by imposing a minimum maintenance period for funds channelled to 
Argentina’s single free exchange market (MULC). In 2002 the Central Bank implemented an 
exchange regulation by imposing a 90-day floor, later increased to 180 and 365 days by the 
Ministry of Economy. Subsequently, other regulations of an indirect nature were adopted 
under Executive Order 616/2005, which required a 30% non-accruing mandatory deposit of 
financial capital inflows designed to discourage speculative hot money that could eventually 
lead to future incidents of abrupt outflows. 
The regulations in the foreign exchange market were aimed at increasing transparency in the 
operations and to make sustainable the stabilisation of the MULC in the medium and long 
term. Additionally, it is important to mention that goods imports may be wholly paid in 
advance, whether by cash or deferred payment, regardless of the type of good. There are no 
restrictions whatsoever to the payment abroad of services rendered by nonresidents, 
regardless of the kind of services (freight, insurance, royalties, technical advice, fees, etc.). 
Related to income, interest, profits and dividends, access to the Single Free Exchange 
Market is allowed in order to pay financial sector and nonfinancial private sector interest 
services.  
With the same aim at stabilising medium and long term exchange market, resident 
individuals and legal entities (as per the definition provided in chapter IV of the IMF's fifth 
edition of the Balance of Payments Manual) outside the financial sector may access the 
Single Free Exchange Market to purchase foreign exchange with a monthly ceiling (originally 
US$ 100, set at US$ 2.000 per month, later increased to US$ 2 million) was imposed on 
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nonresidents, residents' external direct investment contributions, individuals' portfolio 
investment abroad, other unspecified residents' investment abroad, legal entities' portfolio 
investment abroad, foreign currency in order to stabilise the MULC.purchases to be held in 
the country, mutual fund portfolio investment, mutual fund bill purchases and grants. 
4. In January 2002, after 10 years of a currency board, in the middle of foreign exchange and 
banking crises, one of the main goals of economic policy was to establish a single free 
exchange market (MULC) aimed at stabilising the foreign exchange market. The first 
regulations were implemented in November 2001, before the convertibility collapse. With the 
change of the exchange rate regime and after the devaluation, it became mandatory to 
convert to domestic currency, through the MULC, 100% of foreign exchange receipts from 
goods and services exports (FOB, CIF, DDP, EXW, FAS or FCA, as appropriate) and some 
transitory regulations were also implemented in order to restrain short-term financial flows. 
The economy rapidly showed a foreign exchange surplus that remained at relatively high 
levels mainly because of the positive balance of trade, which was only offset in part by a 
larger net demand for foreign currency to pay for services, net income, capital transactions 
and private demand for foreign currency. 
By early 2003, most regulations on foreign transactions were lifted, including restrictions on 
principal and interest payments on financial debt as well as on profit and dividend payments 
(just after the devaluation, in order to stop the depletion of international reserves, Central 
Bank approval was required for some capital income transactions). In addition, monthly limits 
on portfolio investment, direct investment and other external assets were relaxed. 
Simultaneously, the limit on foreign asset holdings by financial institutions and the non-
financial private sector was gradually increased. 
However, as short-term financial capital inflows continued to grow rapidly, other regulatory 
measures were introduced on the capital account. First, minimum stay requirements were 
imposed. New financial borrowing traded in the domestic foreign exchange market and 
rollovers of non-financial private sector and financial sector residents’ external liabilities had 
to be made and kept for at least 365 consecutive days. They could not be repaid before the 
maturity date, regardless of the settlement modality and whether or not that modality involved 
access to the domestic foreign exchange market. The above did not apply to correspondent 
balances of institutions authorised to trade in foreign exchange, insofar as they are not 
financial credit lines, or to primary issues of debt instruments listed and traded in self-
regulated markets. 
Second, according to Executive Order 616/2005, Central Bank Communication “A” 4359 
regulated interest-free deposits with local financial institutions meeting the requirements set 
forth in Communication “A” 4360. Deposits were to be made in US dollars with 30% of the 
equivalent of the total sum when there were foreign exchange inflows into the MULC. Both 
measures, established by the Ministry of Economy, proved to be appropriate in terms of 
reducing short-term financial capital inflows. 
The regulations did not affect regular commercial and financial transactions. In addition: 
(i) there are no restrictions whatsoever on payment abroad for services provided by non-
residents, regardless of the item (freight, insurance, royalties, technical advice, fees, etc); 
(ii) for income (interest and profits and dividends), access to the MULC is allowed in order to 
pay for financial sector and non-financial private sector interest services; (iii) non-residents 
(as defined in Chapter IV of the fifth edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual) may 
access the MULC to purchase foreign exchange to be transferred to their accounts in foreign 
banks with funds collected domestically from: cash import, services, income and other 
current transfers receipts, principal instalments of national government debt issued in foreign 
currency (provided that foreign currency received has been converted to domestic currency 
through the foreign exchange market), residents’ external liabilities from Argentine goods and 
services imports and non-residents’ financial liabilities from foreign loans, validated by the 
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stipulated in Executive Order 616/2005, such as: primary issues of debt instruments listed 
and traded in self-regulated markets; income from non-resident investment applied to 
purchasing real estate; foreign financial lending that is agreed on and settled at an average 
life of no less than two years, taking principal and interest payments into account for the 
calculation; and the foreign inflows used by the private sector to invest in non-financial 
assets.
1 
5. In recent years, the foreign reserve accumulation policy, combined with the sterilisation 
policy, both implemented by the Central Bank, have allowed monetary aggregates to remain 
within the programme bands. Thus, reserve accumulation is sustainable over time and 
compatible with a stable, robust and predictable monetary-financial policy. The results 
obtained reveal the consistency that both mechanisms have been exhibiting (persistent 
accumulation and deep sterilisation). In the past five years the Central Bank has 
accumulated US$ 35.7 billion in reserves and the monetary aggregates have consistently 
remained within the bands foreseen by the monetary programme, helping to preserve the 
equilibrium in the monetary market. 
The reserve accumulation strategy did not have negative repercussions on monetary growth: 
M2 (cash held by the public, deposits in current accounts and deposits in savings accounts in 
pesos) growth (year-on-year) showed a continuous decline. The control of the growth of 
monetary aggregates is a direct reflection of the sterilisation policy carried out by the Central 
Bank. Table 3 shows that during the period 2005–07 the Central Bank absorbed 66% of the 




Foreign currency purchases and sterilisation 












2005 41,170  5,290  35,879  87% 
2006 42,491  16,181  26,309  62% 
2007 37,398  19,533  17,865  48% 
2005–07 121,059  41,005  80,054  66% 
1  Includes the Treasury (single free exchange market).    
2  2006 data do not include the effect of the raising of 
minimum liquidity requirements. 
Source: BCRA. 
 
The sterilisation policy consists of financial transactions that the Central Bank carries out to 
compensate for the purchase of foreign currency where there is an excess supply of foreign 
exchange. By this policy in order to neutralise its impact on domestic interest rate and 
inflation, the Central Bank absorbs the pesos that issues for the purchase of foreign 
exchange. When the Central Bank buys dollars it issues pesos, and tis issuance of pesos 
increases the supply of base money, and if this supply exceeds the amount that is voluntarily 
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demanded, it has to be absorbed in a prudent manner to avoid, as I mentioned, possible 
effects on inflation. The Central Bank therefore reduces the money supply through 
sterilisation, or absorbs the pesos it issues (theoretically, in the extreme case the Central 
Bank absorbs the increase in the monetary base and sells LEBAC and NOBAC by exactly 
the same amount as the initial excess demand for domestic assets, restoring the interest rate 
to its original level. In such a case, the excess supply of foreign exchange is in fact an 
excess demand for domestic assets).
2 
Sterilisation has been carried out through different mechanisms including: (i) early 
cancellation of rediscounts granted by the Central Bank during the 2001–02 crisis (this was 
one of the main monetary contraction factors in 2005 and one of the most significant 
contraction factors in 2006); (ii) issuance of non-monetary short- and medium-term debt 
(LEBAC and NOBAC); (iii) net issuance of reverse repos; (iv) sale of sovereign bonds held in 
the Central Bank portfolio (undertaken occasionally); and (v) changes in the minimum 
reserve requirement.  
6. The Central Bank has been fully aware that the joint application of reserve accumulation 
and sterilisation policies could eventually involve costs, where the interest paid on LEBAC 
and NOBAC exceeds that of the international reserves. The economic literature usually cites 
at least three possible costs resulting from the upward pressure on domestic interest rates 
often associated with the sterilisation of international reserves: (i) the risk of a negative 
impact on investment and growth; (ii) the possibility of excessive stimulation of the inflow of 
short-term capital; and (iii) the possible quasi-fiscal losses.  
In Argentina the trend and level of domestic interest rates, whether nominal or real, at 
historically low levels (especially for loans), the evolution of the nominal exchange rate, the 
low level of international interest rates, the strong economic growth and the role of 
investment in the current expansion, on the one hand, allowed the sterilisation policy to be 
sustainable. On the other hand, what is really of interest for a monetary market like the one in 
Argentina today is not how many pesos the Central Bank issues daily in order to purchase 
foreign currency, but the extent to which these pesos are sterilised. As mentioned earlier, the 
sterilisation policy allows the Central Bank to satisfy the demand for money in an adequate 
manner because it withdraws the surplus pesos from the economy and neither the 
accumulation of reserves nor the sterilisation has affected the level of activity. Regarding 
item (ii), as well as the low interest rates, there are still regulatory restrictions to cushion any 
incentive for short-term financial capital inflows. With regard to item (iii), there are factors that 
make the cost-benefit equation favour the current policy: the continuous quasi-fiscal 
surpluses exhibited by the Central Bank are concrete evidence that the revenues earned as 
the yield on both external assets (reserves) and domestic assets (bonds and rediscounts) 
are more than compensating for the financial costs incurred by the issuance of LEBAC and 
NOBAC. Table 4 shows that the total amount of LEBAC and NOBAC outstanding was 
US$ 52.9 billion at the end of 2007. The Table also shows that, from its peak in June 2007, 
the stock of LEBAC and NOBAC outstanding fell by US$ 8.5 billion as the Central Bank has 
                                                  
2   A macroeconomic inconsistency that is much discussed in the economic literature is summed up as the well 
known “Impossible Trinity” postulate of open economy macroeconomics (the trilemma). According to this 
postulate, in the presence of free mobile capital it is not possible to have a fixed exchange rate and at the 
same time adopt an independent monetary policy. However, some authors argue that under certain 
circumstances it is possible to address those objectives simultaneously. They maintain that if there is an 
excess supply of foreign exchange at some policy rate, the monetary authority can help equilibrate the market 
by buying the excess supply in the foreign exchange market, and can then control the domestic interest rate 
by sterilising the monetary effects of the previous exchange market intervention by some of the instruments 
mentioned above. It is argued that, in doing this, the monetary authority intervention in the exchange market 
helps to achieve the exchange rate policy objective and the intervention in the monetary market, through 
sterilisation, allows it to control the domestic interest rate. BIS Papers No 44  97
 
 
used these instruments, among others, to provide liquidity to the domestic money market 
since mid-2007 when the international financial turbulence began.  
 
Table 4 
Stock of outstanding LEBAC and NOBAC 
End of quarter, in millions of pesos 












March 2002  180  52  0  180 330  2.85 
June 2002  474  221  0  474 1,316 3.80 
September 2002  1,793  237  0  1,793 2,678 3.73 
December 2002  3,049  185  0  3,049 3,671 3.36 
March 2003  4,423  188  0  4,423 4,980 2.96 
June 2003  6,176  125  0  6,176 6,528 2.81 
September 2003  8,264  137  0  8,264 8,661 2.91 
December 2003  9,839  85  178  10,018 10,266  2.93 
March 2004  11,658  77  506  12,164 12,383  2.86 
June 2004  12,749  60  826  13,574 13,751  2.96 
September 2004  12,827  44  982  13,808 13,940  2.98 
December 2004  13,337  54  1,335  14,673 14,834  2.97 
March 2005  15,369  52  1,888  17,256 17,408  2.92 
June 2005  20,172  32  2,924  23,097 23,189  2.89 
September 2005  22,280  31  4,595  26,875 26,965  2.91 
December 2005  19,539  48  6,777  26,315 26,462  3.03 
March 2006  11,765  37  16,299  28,064 28,179  3.08 
June 2006  10,458  38  21,801  32,259 32,377  3.08 
September 2006  10,210  18  28,050  38,260 38,317  3.10 
December 2006  13,126  18  27,676  40,802 40,859  3.07 
March 2007  15,328  19  35,858  51,185 51,244  3.10 
June 2007  25,860  19  35,565  61,425 61,483  3.09 
September 2007  24,699  0  33,982  58,681 58,681  3.15 
November 2007  20,942  0  31,992  52,934 52,934  3.13 
Source: BCRA. 
 
As theoretically acknowledged “… The sustainability of the [sterilisation] policy depends on 
the interest earned by the foreign reserves, the domestic interest rate, the exchange rate 
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base … there is a maximum level for the domestic interest rate that allows the sterilisation 
policy to be sustainable.”
3 
The sterilisation policy has favourable prudential implications, because it imposes a 
quantitative limit on the growth of the monetary aggregates. From the Central Bank point of 
view, a policy that combines both reserve accumulation and monetary sterilisation increases 
confidence in the domestic economy and makes Argentina less vulnerable. This is one of the 
specific assurances that an economy which has been systematically battered by the events 
of the international economy can have: the protection needed to face possible external 
shocks and thus guarantee exchange rate and financial stability and predictability, not only 
over the short term but also the medium- and long-term. 
7. During the 2001–02 crisis, the behaviour of foreign financial institutions differed from that 
of national banks, both public and private. In the 1990s, there was a significant increase in 
foreign financial institutions’ share in the domestic market, through both the purchase of 
domestic banks and the incorporation of new ones. Table 5 shows that in 2000, before the 
crisis broke out, foreign private banks accounted for around 50% of both total credit granted 
to the private sector and private deposits. This percentage fell dramatically during the crisis, 
and by 2003 both shares were reduced by around 10%. Table 5 also shows that in recent 
years foreign banks’ lending and deposits participation continued to decline, reaching 36% 
and 38%, respectively. 
 
Table 5 
Financial intermediation, by group of financial institutions 
In millions of pesos and percentages 
  Private sector loans  Private sector deposits 
  2000 2003 2006 2000 2003 2006 
Public banks  16,680  26.5  9,662  29.8 19,259 25.1 22,092 28.2 27,653 36.9  37,229  30.2
Private 
national 
banks 12,811  20.4  9,433  29.1 26,939 35.1 14,799 18.9 17,025 22.7  38,496  31.2
Private 
foreign banks  31,441 50.0 12,772 39.4 28,059 36.5 41,118 52.4 30,072 40.1 47,218 38.3
Non-bank 
financial inter-
mediaries 1,952  3.1  511  1.6 2,597 3.4 389 0.5 201 0.3  488  0.4
Total 62,884  100  32,378  100 76,853 100 78,397 100 74,951 100  123,431  100
Source: BCRA. 
 
The financial system was able to restore normality to its balance sheets and consolidate the 
recovery of its traditional financial intermediation activity sooner than expected following the 
2001–02 crisis. In that scenario, the strong recovery of domestic credit and deposits was not 
significantly linked either to international markets’ new lending or to the capitalisation of 
foreign liabilities. This trend reflects certain differences compared with the development of 
                                                  
3  Roberto Frenkel, “The Sustainability of Sterilization Policy”, Center for Economic and Policy Research, 
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the financial system before and during the crisis. Positive prospects for the local economy 
and for the financial services business in particular encouraged financial institution 
shareholders to recapitalise their banks. In the case of foreign banks, they contributed 54% 
(US$ 3.1 billion) of the capitalisation that took place following the collapse of the convertibility 
regime (the total amount for the period 2002–07 was US$ 5.7 billion). Of that amount, 75% 
was capitalisation of outstanding debts and earnings, while the remaining 25% was through 
fresh capital. It is important to stress that, as a result of the consolidation of the sector, the 
ratio of capital to risk assets reached 17%, surpassing local and international minimum 
recommended levels. 
Banks led the recovery of funding from the domestic market, mainly through deposits. They 
have shown dynamism in the issuance of corporate bonds (ON) and share subscriptions, 
showing significant progress compared with the early years of the decade (although market 
funding remains low in international terms). Though in an incipient stage, some financial 
entities have marginally increased their longest-term funding through corporate bonds. 
During the first half of 2007, five banks placed corporate bonds (genuine, not linked to 
restructuring processes), virtually all of them denominated in pesos, for US$ 620 million, 
compared with US$ 400 million during 2006 (accounted for by two financial institutions). 
Similarly, a domestic private bank placed IPOs abroad for around US$ 150 million. Foreign 
capital inflows therefore allowed a gradual consolidation of banks’ funding, even though such 
liabilities still represent a low percentage in terms of banks’ liabilities, at 5%. 
Additionally, banks have generated trust funds in the last few years, particularly for improving 
their risk management of both lending and liquidity. Banks placed their assets in trust funds 
for around US$ 3.2 billion in 2005, US$ 3 billion in 2006 and US$ 2.7 billion in 2007. 
In an economic scenario characterised by high volatility and uncertainty, economic agents 
usually prefer to keep their savings in foreign currency and, should banks be allowed to raise 
deposits in foreign currency, they are encouraged to furnish loans in a currency other than 
the domestic legal tender. As shown in the last financial crisis, such preference for foreign 
assets and the resulting currency mismatches make the financial system vulnerable to 
shocks to the exchange rate, which can lead banks to suffer liquidity and solvency problems. 
Bearing in mind the lessons learnt from the crisis, the Central Bank designed a series of 
measures to reduce currency risk, establishing that dollar-denominated deposits should only 
be allocated to lending in dollars, and credit in dollars to companies and households should 
only be granted when income and wages are tied to dollar receipts. In addition, dollar-
denominated deposits and credits are subject to ceilings and capital requirements to limit 
currency mismatches. As a result, banks have reduced the active mismatch from dollar-
denominated items from a post-crisis high of 69% of net worth to a current level of 23% 
(measured as assets in foreign currency minus liabilities in foreign currency over total net 
worth). Indeed, in the post-crisis period, while loans and deposits denominated in local 
currency were gradually expanding, their shares in total assets and liabilities showed an 
extraordinary improvement vis-à-vis the dollarised picture shown pre-crisis. 
8. Until 2002, the domestic futures and options markets were basically confined to agricultural 
commodities. The abandonment of the currency board entailed designing a new strategy for 
improving risk management. By mid-2002, ROFEX (Rosario Foreign Exchange) was licensed 
by the National Exchange Commission to negotiate futures (with the notable participation of the 
Central Bank) and foreign exchange (US dollar) options. Thus, the markets broadened the 
existing market for agricultural derivative instruments to include financial derivatives, which 
allowed the participation of agents other than those from the agricultural sector by 
incorporating the Central Bank as counterparty. Regarding dollar-denominated futures, the 
number of agreements executed amounted to 2.7 billion for US$ 1 each, ie US$ 2.7 billion as a 
whole in 2003, rising to around US$ 23.6 billion. Financial agreements (the majority of which 
are futures denominated in US dollars) represented 99% of the total amount of agreements 
signed by ROFEX during 2007, whereas the remaining 0.94% comprised agricultural 
agreements. In addition, the Electronic Open Market (MAE) started to conduct transactions in 100  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
2004, showing a remarkably dynamic performance: from around 24,000 negotiated 
agreements (for US$ 100,000 each, ie US$ 2.4 billion) in 2005, and during 2007 the number 
increased to 105,500 (US$ 10.55 billion).
4 Other risk hedge markets like those related to 
interest rates (which involve the highest degree of activity throughout the world, whether via 
markets or OTC) are as yet little developed. In relation to global turnover, the derivatives 
market in Argentina is still small. The Central Bank has been a vital player in both markets, 
Rofex and MAE, signing futures contracts on foreign exchange (US dollar/peso). 
5  
9. In spite of the current expansion, Argentine capital markets still show limited growth. In 
particular, the depth of the stock market is low (the stock exchange capitalisation ratio of 
domestic companies to GDP is almost 30%), as is liquidity (the four sectors with the highest 
market value conduct most of the transactions, absorbing a great portion of the liquidity of 
the marketplace). The stock markets are extremely vulnerable to external shocks, are highly 
volatile (due to recurrent crises) and show a remarkable concentration of stock exchange 
capitalisation and turnover with little diversification of sectors (oil, iron and steel, 
telecommunications and finance account for over 80% of the domestic stock exchange 
capitalisation, with oil/natural gas predominating). The market for corporate bonds is small 
compared to those of the main regional economies (below 10% of GDP), and thus even 
smaller compared to those of the developed economies. Furthermore, the issuance of 
corporate bonds, measured in US dollars, has not recovered the nominal values observed 
prior to the 2001–02 crisis. 
Since the crisis, primary market issuance of corporate bonds on the BCBA (Buenos Aires 
Stock Exchange) has fallen in absolute terms (measured in dollars) and relative to GDP. 
After the crisis, corporate financing from markets was restricted to small amounts for the 
short term, except for debt restructuring transactions which accounted for most of the 
transactions during the period 2002–2005. The sector began to recover in 2003, and more so 
after the process of renegotiation of the public debt in default was closed in early 2005. 
There was also a change from the end of 2006, when over 90% of the issuance of corporate 
bonds was linked to new funding. From 2006 through 2007 corporate bonds issued in 
Argentina amounted to US$ 3 billion, below the peak of over US$ 5 billion each year reached 
before the crisis in both 1997 and 1998. 
From another point of view, the issuance of peso-denominated debt, either government or 
corporate, has been lower than that of foreign currency debt, even though since 2007 there 
has been growing issuance in pesos at a fixed rate (though for shorter terms). It is worth 
mentioning that before the 2001–02 crisis broke out, the BCBA had issued negotiable 
obligations on account of new funding, whereas, as mentioned above, from 2002 to 2005 
most local and international issuance by national corporates involved debt restructuring.  
Lastly, the strong economic recovery and the changes in corporate structures – with mergers 
and acquisitions involving a diversification at a global level – that have taken place over the 
last few years have led domestic companies to expand into other regional economies and 
have attracted foreign companies to settle in or purchase companies in Argentina. With 
regard to foreign direct investment, a growing number of international companies have been 
investing in sectors such as tourism, real estate, beverages and foodstuffs, as well as the 
supply of metals and building materials. At the same time, domestic companies from the 
agricultural and metallurgy sectors have made heavy investments abroad.  
                                                  
4  In 2007 the ROFEX daily average turnover of financial agreements was US$ 104 million compared to 
US$ 50 million traded throughout the MAE. 
5   The future contracts on foreign exchange are settled in pesos on a net basis, where the principal amounts are 
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10. To sum up, the Argentine economy has been characterised by a strong dependence on 
external savings, and has shown recurrent current account deficits. For this reason, the 
frequent shifts in international financial capital flows have had a huge impact in terms of 
higher macroeconomic volatility. 
The economic recession that began in 1998 and the collapse of the convertibility system in 
early 2002 were the most recent serious episodes in which capital flow fluctuations had a 
severe impact on the performance of the Argentine economy. For this reason, from 2002 
onwards, one of the main pillars supporting economic policy has been focused on stabilising 
the foreign exchange market and addressing the problems linked to the volatility of short-
term financial capital flows.  
Under this policy, the economy has shown a remarkable recovery, with fiscal and external 
equilibria key characteristics. At the same time, the economy has achieved financial and 
exchange market stabilisation, while international reserves have been growing continuously. 
The favourable economic environment, combined with a positive external context in terms of 
high liquidity and low international interest rates, attracted international investors. As a result, 
demand for peso-denominated assets rose and short-term financial flows became much 
larger than expected. In order to face this situation, some transitory rules on the capital 
account were introduced by the Ministry of Economy, particularly aimed at discouraging 
short-term financial flows (the first regulations on foreign exchange transactions were 
actually established prior to the collapse of the convertibility system). These temporary rules 
have been reduced and do not interfere with investment or consumption decisions. 
Additionally, the Central Bank has been implementing a sterilisation policy in order to keep 
monetary aggregates under control. Argentina’s experience shows that, under certain 
circumstances, this policy is consistent with one of international reserve accumulation. 